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Abstract We propose an epistemic approach to for-
malizing statistical properties of machine learning. Specif-
ically, we introduce a formal model for supervised learn-
ing based on a Kripke model where each possible world
corresponds to a possible dataset and modal opera-
tors are interpreted as transformation and testing on
datasets. Then we formalize various notions of the clas-
sification performance, robustness, and fairness of sta-
tistical classifiers by using our extension of statistical
epistemic logic (StatEL). In this formalization, we show
relationships among properties of classifiers, and rele-
vance between classification performance and robust-
ness. As far as we know, this is the first work that uses
epistemic models and logical formulas to express sta-
tistical properties of machine learning, and would be a
starting point to develop theories of formal specification
of machine learning.
Keywords Modal logic · Possible world semantics ·
Machine learning · Classification performance ·
Robustness · Fairness
1 Introduction
With the increasing use of machine learning in real-
life applications, the safety and security of learning-
based systems have been of great interest. In particular,
many recent studies [40],[12] have found vulnerabilities
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on the robustness of deep neural networks (DNNs) to
malicious inputs, which can lead to disasters in secu-
rity critical systems, such as self-driving cars. To find
out these vulnerabilities in advance, there have been re-
searches on the formal verification and testing methods
for the robustness of DNNs in recent years [23,26,35,
41]. However, relatively little attention has been paid
to the formal specification of machine learning [38].
In the research filed of formal specification and ver-
ification, logical approaches have been shown useful to
characterize desired properties and to develop theo-
ries to discuss those properties. For example, tempo-
ral logic [36] is a branch of modal logic for express-
ing time-dependent propositions, and has been widely
used to describe requirements of hardware and software
systems. For another example, epistemic logic [44] is a
modal logic for knowledge and belief that has been em-
ployed as formal policy languages for distributed sys-
tems (e.g., for the authentication [8] and the anonymity
[39] of security protocols). As far as we know, however,
no prior work has employed logical formulas to rigor-
ously describe various statistical properties of machine
learning, although there are some papers that (often
informally) list various desirable properties of machine
learning [38].
In this paper, we present a first logical formaliza-
tion of statistical properties of machine learning. To de-
scribe the statistical properties in a simple and abstract
way, we extend statistical epistemic logic (StatEL) [27],
which has recently been proposed to describe statis-
tical knowledge and is applied to formalize statistical
hypothesis testing and statistical privacy of databases.
A key idea in our modeling of statistical machine
learning is that we formalize logical aspects in the syn-
tax level, and statistical distances and dataset opera-
tions in the semantics level by using accessibility rela-
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tions of a Kripke model [30]. In this model, we formalize
supervised learning and some of its desirable properties,
including performance, robustness, and fairness. More
specifically, classification performance and robustness
are described as the differences between the correct
class label and the classifier’s prediction, whereas fair-
ness is expressed as a conditional indistinguishability
between different groups.
Our contributions. The main contributions of this work
are as follows:
– We propose a logical approach to formalizing statis-
tical properties of machine learning in a simple and
abstract way. Specifically, we introduce a principle
that logical aspects of statistical properties are de-
scribed in the syntax level, and statistical distances
and datasets are formalized in the semantics level.
– We formalize supervised learning models and test
datasets (used to check whether the learning models
satisfy specification) by employing a distributional
Kripke model [27] where each possible world corre-
sponds to a possible test dataset, and modal oper-
ators are interpreted as transformation and testing
on datasets. Then we show how the sampling from
a dataset and non-deterministic adversarial inputs
are formalized in the distributional Kripke model.
– We propose an extension of statistical epistemic logic
(StatEL) as a formal language to describe various
properties of machine learning models, including the
performance, robustness, and fairness of statistical
classifiers. Then the satisfaction of logical formu-
las representing those properties is associated with
their testing using a test dataset. As far as we know,
this is the first work that uses logical formulas to
formalize various statistical properties of machine
learning, and that provides an epistemic view on
those properties.
– We show some relationships among properties of
classifiers, such as different levels of robustness. We
also present certain relationships between classifi-
cation performance and robustness, which suggest
robustness-related properties that have not been for-
malized in the literature as far as we know.
Cautions and limitations. In this paper, we focus on
formalizing properties of supervised learning models that
may be tested by using a dataset; i.e., we do not deal
with unsupervised learning, reinforcement learning, the
properties of learning algorithms, quality of training
data (e.g., sample bias), quality of testing (e.g., cov-
erage criteria), explainability, temporal properties, or
system-level specification. It should be noted that most
of the properties formalized in this paper have been
known in machine learning literatures, and the novelty
of this work lies in the logical formulation of those sta-
tistical properties.
We also highlight that this work aims to provide a
logical approach to the modeling of statistical proper-
ties tested with a dataset, and does not present meth-
ods for checking, guaranteeing, or improving the perfor-
mance/robustness/fairness of machine learning models.
As for the satisfiability of logical formulas, we leave the
development of testing and (statistical) model check-
ing algorithms as future work, since the research area
on the testing and verification of machine learning is
relatively new and needs further techniques to improve
the scalability. Moreover, in some applications such as
image recognition, some atomic formulas (e.g., repre-
senting whether an input image is a panda) cannot
be defined mathematically, and require additional tech-
niques based on experiments. Nevertheless, we demon-
strate that describing various properties using logical
formulas is useful to explore desirable properties and
to discuss their relationships in a framework.
Finally, we emphasize that our work is the first at-
tempt to use epistemic models and logical formulas to
express statistical properties of machine learning mod-
els, and would be a starting point to develop theories
of formal specification of machine learning in future re-
search.
Relationship with the preliminary version. The main
novelties of this paper with respect to the preliminary
version [28] are as follows:
– We add how the satisfaction of a formula at a pos-
sible world can be regarded as the testing of a spec-
ification using a test dataset (Sect. 3.1).
– We show how modal operators are used to model
the transformation and testing on datasets. For ex-
ample, data preparation T (e.g., data cleaning, data
augmentation) can also be formalized as a modal
operator ∆T (Sect. 3.2).
– We re-interpret the non-classical implication ⊃ for
conditional probabilities in StatEL as a modal oper-
ator associated with a conditioning relation (Sect. 3.3).
– We introduce a modal operator ∼ε,Dx for conditional
indistinguishability (Sect. 3.4). Then we provide a
more comprehensible formalization of the fairness of
supervised learning (Sect. 7) without using counter-
factual epistemic operators [28], because the formal-
ization using these operators requires an additional
formula and makes the presentation more compli-
cated and unintuitive.
– We add a formalization of generalization error to
capture how accurately a classifier is able to classify
previously unseen input data (Sect. 5.3).
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– We add a formalization of other fairness notions
called separation (Sect. 7.3) and sufficiency (Sect. 7.4)
so that this paper covers all three categories of fair-
ness notions [5].
– We show a running example of a pedestrian detec-
tion to illustrate the formalization of various notions
of performance, robustness, and fairness.
Paper organization. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. Sect. 2 presents notations used in this paper
and provides background on statistical distances and
statistical epistemic logic (StatEL). Sect. 3 introduces
a different view on the modal operators in StatEL and
extends the logic with additional operators. Sect. 4 in-
troduces a formal model for describing the behaviors of
statistical classifiers and non-deterministic adversarial
inputs. Sects. 5, 6, and 7 respectively formalize vari-
ous notions of the performance, robustness, and fairness
of classifiers by using our extension of StatEL. Sect. 8
presents related work and Sect. 9 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some notations, and re-
view background on statistical distance notions and
the syntax and semantics of statistical epistemic logic
(StatEL), introduced in [27].
2.1 Notations
Let R≥0 be the set of non-negative real numbers, and
[0, 1] be the set of non-negative real numbers not greater
than 1. We denote by DO the set of all probability
distributions over a finite set O. Given a finite set O
and a probability distribution µ ∈ DO, the probability
of sampling a value v from µ is denoted by µ[v]. For a
subset R ⊆ O, let µ[R] = ∑v∈R µ[v]. For a distribution
µ over a finite set O, its support is defined by supp(µ) =
{v ∈ O : µ[v] > 0}.
2.2 Statistical Distance
We recall popular notions of distance between proba-
bility distributions: total variation and ∞-Wasserstein
distance.
Informally, total variation between two distributions
µ0 and µ1 over a set O represents the largest difference
between the probabilities that µ0 and µ1 assign to an
identical subset R of O.
Definition 1 (Total variation) For a finite set O,
the total variation Dtv of two distributions µ0, µ1 ∈ DO
is defined by:
Dtv(µ0 ‖ µ1) def= sup
R⊆O
|µ0[R]− µ1[R]|.
We then recall the∞-Wasserstein metric [43]. Intu-
itively, the ∞-Wasserstein metric Wd(µ0, µ1) between
two distributions µ0, µ1 represents the minimum largest
move between points in a transportation from µ0 to µ1.
Definition 2 (∞-Wasserstein metric) Let O be a
finite set and d : O × O → R≥0 be a metric over O.
The ∞-Wasserstein metric Wd w.r.t. d between two
distributions µ0, µ1 ∈ DO is defined by:
Wd(µ0, µ1) = min
µ∈cp(µ0,µ1)
max
(v0,v1)∈supp(µ)
d(v0, v1)
where cp(µ0, µ1) is the set of all couplings
1 of µ0 and µ1.
2.3 Syntax of StatEL
We next recall the syntax of statistical epistemic logic
(StatEL) [27], which has two levels of formulas: static
and epistemic formulas. Intuitively, a static formula de-
scribes a proposition satisfied at a (deterministic) state,
while an epistemic formula describes a proposition sat-
isfied at a probability distribution of states. In this pa-
per, the former is used only to define the latter.
Formally, let Mes be a set of symbols called mea-
surement variables, and Γ be a set of atomic formulas
of the form γ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for a predicate symbol γ,
n ≥ 0, and x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ Mes. Let I ⊆ [0, 1] be a
finite union of disjoint intervals, and A be a finite set
of indices (e.g., associated with statistical divergences).
Then the formulas are defined by:
Static formulas: ψ ::= γ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) | ¬ψ |ψ ∧ ψ
Epistemic formulas: ϕ ::= PI ψ | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ϕ |ψ⊃ϕ |Kaϕ
where a ∈ A. We denote by F the set of all epistemic
formulas. Note that we have no quantifiers over mea-
surement variables. (See Sect. 2.5 for more details.)
The probability quantification PI ψ represents that
a static formula ψ is satisfied with a probability be-
longing to a set I. For instance, P(0.95,1] ψ represents
that ψ holds with a probability greater than 0.95. By
1 A coupling of two distributions µ0, µ1 ∈ DO is a joint dis-
tribution µ ∈ D(O×O) such that µ0 and µ1 are µ’s marginal
distributions, i.e., for each v0 ∈ O, µ0[v0] =
∑
v′
1
∈O µ[v0, v
′
1]
and for each v1 ∈ O, µ1[v1] =
∑
v′
0
∈O µ[v
′
0, v1]. For a cou-
pling µ, the support supp(µ) is the maximum subset of O×O
whose elements are assigned non-zero probabilities in µ.
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ψ ⊃ PI ψ′ we represent that the conditional probabil-
ity of ψ′ given ψ is included in a set I. The epistemic
knowledge Ka ϕ expresses that we know ϕ when our
capability of observation is denoted by a ∈ A.
As syntax sugar, we use disjunction ∨, classical im-
plication →, and epistemic possibility Pa, defined as
usual by: ϕ0∨ϕ1 ::=¬(¬ϕ0∧¬ϕ1), ϕ0 → ϕ1 ::=¬ϕ0∨ϕ1,
and Pa ϕ ::=¬Ka ¬ϕ. When I is a singleton {i}, we ab-
breviate PI as Pi.
2.4 Distributional Kripke Model
Next we recall the notion of a distributional Kripke
model [27], where each possible world is associated with
a probability distribution over a set of states, and with
a stochastic assignment of data to measurement vari-
ables.
Definition 3 (Distributional Kripke model) Let
A be a finite set of indices (typically associated with
operations and tests on datasets), S be a finite set of
states, and O be a finite set of data, called a data do-
main. A distributional Kripke model is a tuple M =
(W, (Ra)a∈A, (Vs)s∈S) consisting of:
– a non-empty set W of multisets of states belonging
to S;
– for each a ∈ A, an accessibility relationRa ⊆ W×W;
– for each s ∈ S, a valuation Vs : Γ → P(Ok) that
maps each k-ary predicate γ to a set Vs(γ) of k-
tuples of data.
The set W is called a universe, and its elements are
called possible worlds. A world is said to be finite if it is
a finite multiset, i.e., it has a finite number of (possibly
duplicated) elements. A world is said to be infinite if it
is an infinite multiset.
The relationRa determines an accessibility between
two worlds. For example, (w,w′) ∈ Ra means that a
world w′ is accessible from a world w when our capa-
bility of distinguishing possible worlds is denoted by
a ∈ A. The valuation Vs may give a possibly different
interpretation of a predicate γ at a different state s. We
assume that all measurement variables range over the
same data domain O in every world. The interpreta-
tion of measurement variables at a state s is given by a
deterministic assignment σs defined below.
Definition 4 (Deterministic assignment) For any
distributional Kripke modelM=(W, (Ra)a∈A, (Vs)s∈S),
we assume that each world w ∈ W is associated with
a function ρw : Mes × S → O that maps each mea-
surement variable x to its value ρw(x, s) that is ob-
served at a state s belonging to the world w. We also
assume that each state s in a world w is associated with
the deterministic assignment σs : Mes → O defined by
σs(x) = ρw(x, s).
Since each world w is a multiset of states, we abuse
the notation and denote by w[s] the probability that
a state s is randomly chosen from w (i.e., the number
of occurrences of s in the multiset w, divided by the
total number of elements in w). Here we regard each
world w as a probability distribution over the states
that corresponds to the multiset.
The probability that a measurement variable x ∈
Mes has a value v ∈ O is: σw(x)[v] =
∑
s∈w,σs(x)=v w[s].
Note that σw : Mes → DO maps each measurement
variable x to a probability distribution σw(x) over the
data domain O. Hence σw represents the joint proba-
bility distribution of all variables in Mes, and is called
the stochastic assignment at w. When a state s is uni-
formly drawn from a multiset w of states, a datum σs(x)
is sampled from the distribution σw(x).
In later sections, a possible world corresponds to
a dataset (i.e., a multiset of data tuples) from which
data are sampled. For example, suppose that we have
only three measurement variables Mes = {x, y, z}. Then
for each state s in a world w, the deterministic as-
signment σs : Mes → O represents the tuple of data
(σs(x), σs(y), σs(z)). Hence each state s corresponds to
a tuple of data, and the world w corresponds to the
dataset {(σs(x), σs(y), σs(z)) | s ∈ w}.
2.5 Stochastic Semantics of StatEL
Now we recall the stochastic semantics [27] for the StatEL
formulas over a distributional Kripke model M = (W,
(Ra)a∈A, (Vs)s∈S) with W = DS.
The interpretation of a static formulas ψ at a state
s is given by:
s |= γ(x1, . . . , xk) iff (σs(x1), . . . , σs(xk)) ∈ Vs(γ)
s |= ¬ψ iff s 6|= ψ
s |= ψ ∧ ψ′ iff s |= ψ and s |= ψ′.
The restriction w|ψ of a world w to a static formula
ψ is defined by w|ψ[s] = w[s]∑
s′:s′|=ψ w[s′]
if s |= ψ, and
w|ψ[s] = 0 otherwise. Note that w|ψ is undefined if
there is no state s that satisfies ψ and has a non-zero
probability in w.
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Then the interpretation of epistemic formulas in a
world w is defined by:
M, w |= PI ψ iff Pr
[
s
$← w : s |= ψ
]
∈ I
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|= ϕ
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ϕ′
M, w |= ψ ⊃ ϕ iff w|ψ is defined and M, w|ψ |= ϕ
M, w |= Ka ϕ iff for every w′ s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Ra,
M, w′ |= ϕ,
where s
$← w represents that a state s is sampled from
the distribution w.
ThenM, w |= ψ0 ⊃ PI ψ1 represents that the condi-
tional probability of satisfying a static formula ψ1 given
another ψ0 is included in a set I at a world w.
In each world w, measurement variables can be in-
terpreted using σw. This allows us to assign different
values to different occurrences of a variable in a for-
mula; E.g., in ϕ(x) → Ka ϕ′(x), x occurring in ϕ(x)
is interpreted by σw in a world w, while x in ϕ
′(x) is
interpreted by σw′ in another w
′ s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Ra.
Finally, the interpretation of an epistemic formula
ϕ in M is given by:
M |= ϕ iff for every world w in M, M, w |= ϕ.
Hereafter we mainly focus on the satisfaction local
to a possible world, and M may be omitted when it is
clear from the context.
3 Modality as Transformation and Testing on
Datasets
In this section we introduce a different view on the
modal operators in statistical epistemic logic (StatEL),
and define additional modal operators that are used
to formalize various properties of machine learning in
Sects. 5 to 7.
3.1 Checking Satisfaction at a World as Testing with a
Dataset
We first show how we regard the satisfaction of a for-
mula ϕ as testing a system’s specification expressed by
ϕ as follows.
As explained in Sect. 2.4, a possible world corre-
sponds to a possible dataset. Thus, given a model M,
a world w, and a formula ϕ, checking the satisfaction
M, w |= ϕ can be regarded as testing whether the spec-
ification ϕ of a system (e.g., a machine learning model
we formalize in Sect. 4) is satisfied when the dataset w
provides inputs to the system. For example, let ϕ be a
formula representing that a machine learning task (e.g.,
classification) C fails with probability at most 5%. Then
M, w |= ϕ represents that when the learning task C is
performed using a test dataset w, then it fails for at
most 5% of the test data in w.
For simplicity, we discuss the satisfaction of the for-
mulas ϕ in which neither Ka nor Pa occurs as follows.
For each state (namely, data tuple) s ∈ w and for
each static sub-formula ψ of ϕ, we can efficiently check
whether s |= ψ.
When the dataset w is finite (i.e., it is a finite multi-
set of data tuples), we can check the satisfaction w |= ϕ
in finite time, more precisely, in linear time in the num-
ber of elements in w.
When the dataset w is infinite, however, we cannot
check whether w |= ϕ in general. For example, suppose
that w is the infinite dataset representing a true dis-
tribution from which data are sampled and observed.
When we cannot learn w itself, we usually obtain a fi-
nite dataset w fin by sampling data from w repeatedly
and independently and check a specification ϕ only with
this test dataset w fin.
Hereafter, we mainly deal with distributional Kripke
modelsM that have infinite numbers of finite worlds. In
the following sections except Sect. 6, we deal only with
formulas without Ka nor Pa,
2 hence can check their
satisfaction at a finite world in finite time.
3.2 Modal Operators for Dataset Transformation
In the rest of Sect. 3, we show that modal operators
can be used to model the transformation and testing
on datasets.
First, we introduce modal operators for dataset trans-
formation. The modal operator ∆T defined below is
unary (i.e., taking a single formula as argument), and is
parameterized with a transformation T between datasets.
Intuitively, w |= ∆Tϕ represents that a formula ϕ is sat-
isfied for the dataset w′ that is obtained by transform-
ing the current dataset w by T . Formally, the modal
operator ∆T is interpreted as follows.
Definition 5 (Modality ∆T for a dataset trans-
formation T ) Given a function T : W → W, we de-
2 The testing of a formula ϕ is not feasible when an epis-
temic operator Ka or Pa occurs in ϕ and the model M has
a large number of possible worlds. Detailed analysis of time
complexity of StatEL is out of the scope of this paper, and
should be included in the journal version of our paper [27] that
proposed StatEL. As we will discuss in Sect. 6, the robust-
ness of machine learning is formalized using these epistemic
operators, hence cannot be tested in practical time unless M
is comprised of a small number of worlds.
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fine an accessibility relation as RT def= {(w,w′) | w′ =
T (w)}. Then we define the interpretation of ∆T by:
M, w |= ∆Tϕ
iff there is a w′ s.t. (w,w′) ∈ RT and M, w′ |= ϕ.
For example, machine learning often require data
preparation to manipulate a given raw dataset into a
form that makes a machine learning task feasible and
more effective (e.g., data cleaning, data augmentation).
For a dataset w and two ways of data preparation T0
and T1, w |= ∆T0ϕ ∧∆T1ϕ represents that a property
ϕ holds for the two prepared datasets T0(w) and T1(w).
For another example, the security of machine learn-
ing often assumes a certain malicious adversary that
can manipulate a given dataset to make a machine
learning task fail. Such adversarial operations T on
datasets can also be formalized using a different modal
operator corresponding to T as we will explain in Sect. 6.
In the next section, we show that the logical con-
nective ⊃ can be re-interpreted as the modality ∆T for
some dataset transformation T .
3.3 Modality for Conditioning
We then present another interpretation of the logical
connective ⊃ (defined in Sect. 2.5) used to express con-
ditional probabilities in Sects. 5 and 6. Roughly speak-
ing, we regard the restriction w|ψ of a world w to a
static formula ψ as a transformation Rψ of w. Then
we redefine ⊃ as a modal operator associated with Rψ,
and call it the conditioning operator. Formally, the in-
terpretation of ⊃ is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Conditioning operator ⊃) Assume
that the universe W includes all sub-multisets of each
w ∈ W. Given a static formula ψ, we define an ac-
cessibility relation as the conditioning relation Rψ def=
{(w,w|ψ) | w ∈ W}. Then the interpretation of the
conditioning operator ⊃ is given by:
M, w |= ψ ⊃ ϕ
iff there is a w′ s.t. (w,w′) ∈ Rψ and M, w′ |= ϕ.
Intuitively, w |= ψ ⊃ ϕ corresponds to the two op-
erations: (i) transforming the given dataset w to the
sub-dataset w|ψ and (ii) testing whether a property ϕ
holds for the sub-dataset w|ψ. When no data in the
dataset w satisfies the property ψ, we can describe this
as M, w |= ψ ⊃ ⊥ by using the propositional constant
falsum ⊥.
Note that the conditioning ψ ⊃ ϕ can be regarded
as the modal formula ∆Tϕ with the dataset transfor-
mation T where T (w) = w|ψ for all w ∈ W.
In Sects. 5 and 6, we show concrete examples us-
ing the conditioning operator ⊃, i.e., the classification
performance and robustness of statistical classifiers.
3.4 Modality for Conditional Indistinguishability
Next, we introduce a modal operator that is used to
formalize the fairness of machine learning in Sect. 7.
Given two static formulas ψ0, ψ1 (e.g., representing
male and female), w|ψ0(x) (resp. w|ψ1(x)) represents
the probability distribution of values of a measurement
variable x generated from the sub-dataset w|ψ0 , e.g.,
the sub-dataset about male (resp. w|ψ1 , e.g., about fe-
male). To formalize a certain similarity between x’s val-
ues generated from the two sub-datasets (e.g., between
the benefits for male and for female), we introduce a
modal operator ∼ε,Dx for conditional indistinguishabil-
ity as follows. We write ψ0 ∼ε,Dx ψ1 to represent that
the two distributions w|ψ0(x) and w|ψ1(x) are indistin-
guishable up to a threshold ε in terms of a divergence
or distance D. Formally, this modality is defined as fol-
lows.3
Definition 7 (Conditional indistinguishability op-
erator ∼ε,Dx ) Assume that the universe W includes all
sub-multisets of each w ∈ W. Given an x ∈ Mes, an
ε ∈ R≥0, and a divergence or distance D : DO×DO →
R≥0, we define an accessibility relation by:
Rε,Dx def= {(w0, w1) ∈ W ×W |D(σw0(x)‖σw1(x)) ≤ ε}.
Then for static formulas ψ0 and ψ1, we define the in-
terpretation of ψ0 ∼ε,Dx ψ1 by:
M, w |= ψ0 ∼ε,Dx ψ1
iff there exist w0, w1 s.t. (w,w0) ∈ Rψ0 ,
(w,w1) ∈ Rψ1 , and (w0, w1) ∈ Rε,Dx ,
where Rψ0 and Rψ1 are two conditioning relations in
Definition 6.
Note that two worlds are related by Rε,Dx if they
have close probability distributions of the values of x.
Intuitively, w |= ψ0 ∼ε,Dx ψ1 corresponds to the two op-
erations: (i) transforming the given dataset w to the two
sub-datasets w|ψ0 and w|ψ1 , and (ii) testing whether the
probability distribution of x generated by the dataset
w|ψ0 is indistinguishable from the distribution gener-
ated by the dataset w|ψ1 .
When ε = 0, the operator ∼ε,Dx represents the iden-
tity of two distributions.
3 The semantics for the (binary) composite operator in the
arrow logic [7] resembles that for ∼ε,Dx in Definition 7, al-
though it has a totally different meaning and motivation.
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Proposition 1 For a world w, static formulas ψ0, ψ1,
and a measurement variable x, w |= ψ0 ∼0,Dx ψ1 iff the
distribution w|ψ0(x) is identical to w|ψ1(x).
This proposition is immediate from the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 For a world w, static formulas ψ0, ψ1, and
a measurement variable x,
w |= ψ0 ∼ε,Dx ψ1 iff D(σw|ψ0 (x) ‖ σw|ψ1 (x)) ≤ ε.
Proof Let w0 = w|ψ0 and w1 = w|ψ1 . Then by Defi-
nition 6, we have (w,w0) ∈ Rψ0 and (w,w1) ∈ Rψ1 .
Hence this lemma follows from Definition 7. uunionsq
In Sect. 7, we present examples using the conditional
indistinguishability operator, i.e., we formalize various
notions of fairness in machine learning by using this
operator and the above proposition and lemma.
3.5 Summary on the Modal Language
In summary, modal operators are used to represent
transformation and testing on datasets. The unary modal
operator∆T is regarded as a transformation T on datasets,
while the binary modal operators ⊃ and ∼ε,Dx are re-
garded as transforming-then-testing on datasets.
Now the syntax of the formulas is given by:
Static formulas:
ψ ::= γ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ
Dataset formulas:
ϕ ::= PI ψ | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ϕ |∆Tϕ |ψ ⊃ ϕ |ψ0 ∼ε,Dx ψ1 | Ka ϕ,
where the epistemic formulas with the additional modal-
ity are called dataset formulas, since they are inter-
preted in a world that corresponds to a dataset.
When multiple transformations/testing are sequen-
tially applied to datasets, we can use dataset formulas
in which different modal operators are nested. For ex-
ample, w |= ∆T (ψ ⊃ ϕ) represents that after applying
a data preparation T to a dataset w, a property ϕ holds
for the sub-dataset T (w)|ψ that satisfies ψ.
4 Epistemic Model for Supervised Learning
In this section we introduce a formal model for super-
vised learning. Specifically, we employ a distributional
Kripke model (Definition 3), and formalize a behavior
of a classifier C and a non-deterministic input x from
an adversary in the model. In this formalization, we fo-
cus only on the testing of supervised learning models,
and do not formalize the training of supervised learning
models or learning algorithms themselves.
4.1 Classification Problems
Multiclass classification is the problem of classifying a
given input into one of multiple classes. Let L be a finite
set of class labels4, and D be a finite set of input data
(called feature vectors) that we want to classify. Then a
classifier is a function C : D → L that receives an input
datum v and predicts which class (among L) the input
v belongs to. In this work, we deal with a situation
where some classifier C has already been obtained and
its properties should be evaluated, and do not model or
reason about how classifiers are trained from a training
dataset.
We assume a scoring function f : D × L → R that
gives a score f(v, `) of predicting the class of an input
datum (feature vector) v as a label `. Then for each
input v ∈ D, we denote by H(v) = ` to represent that
a label ` maximizes f(v, `). For example, when the in-
put v is an image of an animal and ` is the animal’s
name, then H(v) = ` may represent that an oracle (or
a “human”) classifies the image v as `.
4.2 Modeling the Behaviors of Classifiers
A classifier is formalized on a distributional Kripke
modelM = (W, (Ra)a∈A, (Vs)s∈S) withW = DS. Then
W is an infinite set of possible worlds that corresponds
to all possible datasets from which the classifier can re-
ceive input data. We denote by wtest ∈ W a real world
that corresponds to a test dataset. Recall that each
world w ∈ W is a multiset of states over S and is as-
sociated with a stochastic assignment σw : Mes → DO
that is consistent with the deterministic assignments σs
for all s ∈ w, as explained in Sect. 2.4.
We present an overview of our formalization in Fig. 1.
We denote by x ∈ Mes an input datum given to the
classifier C (and to the oracle H), by y ∈ Mes a correct
label given by the oracle H, and by yˆ ∈ Mes a label
predicted by C. We assume that the input variable x
(resp. the output variables y, yˆ) ranges over the set D of
input data (resp. the set L of labels); i.e., the determin-
istic assignment σs at each state s ∈ S has the range
O = D∪L and satisfies σs(x) ∈ D and σs(y), σs(yˆ) ∈ L.
A key idea in our modeling is that we describe logi-
cal aspects of statistical properties in the syntax level by
using logical formulas, and model statistical distances
and dataset operations in the semantics level by us-
ing accessibility relations in the distributional Kripke
4 The regression can be regarded as the classification prob-
lem when the label ranges over the real numbers, hence it
can be formalized using a distributional Kripke model analo-
gously. For simplicity, however, we deal only with the classi-
fication problems in this paper.
8 Yusuke Kawamoto
State s0

ffi
fi
fl
input
σs0 (x)
-
output
σs0 (yˆ)
-Classifier
C
State s1

ffi
fi
fl
input
σs1 (x)
-
output
σs1 (yˆ)
-Classifier
C
··
·
··
·
Possible world w
(test dataset)
Fig. 1: A world w is chosen non-deterministically and corresponds to a test dataset. With probability w[si], the
world w is in a deterministic state si where the classifier C receives the input value σsi(x) and returns the output
value σsi(yˆ). Each state si can be regarded as a tuple (σsi(x), σsi(y), σsi(yˆ)) ∈ D × L × L consisting of an input
datum, an actual label, and a predicted label.
model. In this way, we can formalize various statistical
properties of classifiers in a simple and abstract way.
To formalize the classifier C, we introduce a static
formula ψ(x, yˆ) to represent that C classifies a given
input x as a class yˆ. We also introduce a static formula
h(x, y) to represent that y is the actual class of an in-
put x. As an abbreviation, we write ψ`(x) (resp. h`(x))
to denote ψ(x, `) (resp. h(x, `)). Formally, these static
formulas are interpreted at each state s ∈ S as follows:
s |= ψ(x, yˆ) iff C(σs(x)) = σs(yˆ).
s |= h(x, y) iff H(σs(x)) = σs(y).
4.3 Modeling the Non-deterministic Inputs from
Adversaries
We first observe that a distributional Kripke model M
can formalize an input x that is probabilistically cho-
sen from a given dataset. As explained in Sect. 2.4, each
world w corresponds to a test dataset. When a state s is
drawn from a multiset w of states, an input value σs(x)
is sampled from the distribution σw(x), and assigned
to the measurement variable x. The set of all possi-
ble probability distributions of inputs is represented by
Λ
def
= {σw(x) | w ∈ W}, which is possibly an infinite set.
For example, let us consider testing the classifier C
with the actual test dataset σwtest(x). When C classifies
an input x as a label ` with probability 0.2, i.e.,
Pr
[
v
$← σwtest(x) : C(v) = `
]
= 0.2,
then this can be expressed by:
M,wtest |= P0.2 ψ`(x).
Next we observe that our model can formalize a non-
deterministic input x from an adversary as follows. Al-
though each state s in a possible world w is assigned the
probability w[s], each world w itself is not assigned a
probability. Thus, each input distribution σw(x) ∈ Λ it-
self is also not assigned a probability, hence our model
assumes no probability distribution over Λ. In other
words, we assume that a world w and thus an input dis-
tribution σw(x) are non-deterministically chosen. This
is useful to model an adversary that provides malicious
inputs to the classifier C to make its prediction fail,
because we usually do not have a prior knowledge of
the probability distribution of malicious inputs from
adversaries, and need to reason about the worst cases
caused by the attack. In Sect. 6, this formalization of
non-deterministic inputs is used to express the robust-
ness of classifiers.
Finally, it should be noted that we cannot enumer-
ate all possible adversarial inputs, hence cannot enu-
merate all possible datasets to construct the universe
W. Since W can be an infinite set and is unspecified,
we cannot check whether a formula expressing a se-
curity property against an adversary is satisfied in all
possible worlds of W. Nevertheless, as shown in later
sections, describing various properties using our exten-
sion of StatEL is useful to explore desirable properties
and to discuss relationships among them.
5 Formalizing the Classification Performance
In this section we show a formalization of classification
performance using our extension of StatEL. We formal-
ize popular measures of classification performance, in-
cluding precision, recall, and accuracy, and measures for
evaluating overfitting, such as the generalization error.
See Fig. 2 for basic ideas on these formalizations.
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Table 1: Logical description of the table of confusion
Actual class
positive negative Prevalence`,I(x) Accuracy`,I(x)
h`(x) ¬h`(x) def= PI(h`(x)) def= PI(ψ`(x)↔ h`(x))
Positive
prediction tp(x)
def
= fp(x)
def
= Precision`,I(x)
def
= FDR`,I(x)
def
=
ψ`(x) ψ`(x) ∧ h`(x) ψ`(x) ∧ ¬h`(x) ψ`(x) ⊃ PI h`(x) ψ`(x) ⊃ PI ¬h`(x)
Negative
prediction fn(x)
def
= tn(x)
def
= FOR`,I(x)
def
= NPV`,I(x)
def
=
¬ψ`(x) ¬ψ`(x) ∧ h`(x) ¬ψ`(x) ∧ ¬h`(x) ¬ψ`(x) ⊃ PI h`(x) ¬ψ`(x) ⊃ PI ¬h`(x)
Recall`,I(x)
def
= FallOut`,I(x)
def
=
h`(x) ⊃ PI ψ`(x) ¬h`(x) ⊃ PI ψ`(x)
MissRate`,I(x)
def
= Specificity`,I(x)
def
=
h`(x) ⊃ PI ¬ψ`(x) ¬h`(x) ⊃ PI ¬ψ`(x)
5.1 Classifier’s Prediction and its Correctness
In classification problems, the terms positive/negative
represent the result of the classifier’s prediction, and the
terms true/false represent whether the classifier pre-
dicts correctly or not. Then the following terminologies
are commonly used:
– true positive (tp): both the prediction and actual
class are positive;
– true negative (tn): both the prediction and actual
class are negative;
– false positive (fp): the prediction is positive but the
actual class is negative;
– false negative (fn): the prediction is negative but
the actual class is positive.
These terminologies can be formalized using static for-
mulas as shown in Table 1. For example, when an in-
put x shows true positive at a state s, this can be ex-
pressed as s |= ψ`(x) ∧ h`(x). Note that the value of
the measurement variable x is uniquely determined by
the assignment σs at the state s. True negative, false
positive (type I error), and false negative (type II er-
ror) are respectively expressed as s |= ¬ψ`(x)∧¬h`(x),
s |= ψ`(x) ∧ ¬h`(x), and s |= ¬ψ`(x) ∧ h`(x).
5.2 Precision, Recall, Accuracy, and Other
Performance Measures
Next we formalize three popular measures for binary
classification performance: precision, recall, and accu-
racy. In Table 1 we summarize the formalization of
various notions of classification performance using our
dataset formulas.
In theory, these notions should be formalized with
the infinite dataset w true representing the true distribu-
tion. However, we usually cannot obtain w true or test
the performance measures using w true. Hence, we often
sample a finite test dataset wtest from the true distribu-
tion and regard it as an approximation of w true.
5
Given a test dataset wtest, precision (positive pre-
dictive value) is defined as the conditional probability
that the prediction is correct given that the prediction
is positive; i.e., precision = tptp+fp . Since the probability
distribution of the input x in the world wtest is expressed
by σwtest(x) as explained in Sect. 4.3, the precision being
within an interval I is given by:
Pr
[
v
$← σwtest(x) : H(v) = `
∣∣∣ C(v) = ` ] ∈ I,
which can be written as:
Pr
[
s
$← wtest : s |= h`(x)
∣∣∣ s |= ψ`(x) ] ∈ I.
By using StatEL, this can be formalized as:
M,wtest |= Precision`,I(x)
where Precision`,I(x)
def
= ψ`(x) ⊃ PI h`(x).
Here ⊃ is the conditioning operator defined in Sect. 3.3.
The value of precision depends on the test dataset wtest,
and can be computed in finite time since wtest is finite.
Symmetrically, recall (true positive rate) is defined
as the conditional probability that the prediction is cor-
rect given that the actual class is positive; i.e., recall =
tp
tp+fn . Then the recall being within I is formalized as:
Recall`,I(x)
def
= h`(x) ⊃ PI ψ`(x).
Finally, accuracy is the probability that the classifier
predicts correctly; i.e., accuracy = tp+tntp+tn+fp+fn . Then
the accuracy being within I is formalized as:
Accuracy`,I(x)
def
= PI
(
ψ`(x)↔ h`(x)
)
,
5 Since the test dataset wtest is finite, there can be missing
data that are not included in wtest but are sampled from the
true distribution w true with a very small probability.
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σw train (x)
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σs′(y)input
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Performance
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Fig. 2: The classification performance compares the oracle H’s output with that of the classifier C’s, while the
evaluation of overfitting compares the expected loss by the test dataset with that by the training dataset.
which can also be defined as PI
(
tp(x) ∨ tn(x)). When
we measure the accuracy after a data preparation op-
eration T (e.g., data cleaning) to the test dataset wtest,
this can be represented by wtest |= ∆TAccuracy`,I(x).
Example 1 (Performance of pedestrian detection) Let
us consider an autonomous car that uses a machine
learning classifier to detect a person crossing the road.
For the sake of simplicity, we formalize an example of a
binary classifier C that detects whether or not a pedes-
trian is crossing the road in a photo image in a test
dataset wtest. We write sunny(x) (resp. snowy(x)) to
represent that a photo x was taken on a sunny (resp.
snowy) day. Let ψ`(x) (resp. h`(x)) represent that the
classifier C (resp. the human) detects a pedestrian cross-
ing the road in an image x.
We empirically measure recall (i.e., the conditional
probability that C detects a pedestrian crossing the
road when the input image x actually includes it) by us-
ing the data collected on sunny days. When C achieves
a recall of 0.95 on sunny days, this is represented by
wtest |= sunny(x) ⊃ Recall`,0.95(x).
Since C should detect a pedestrian also on a snow-
covered road, it should be tested with the data collected
on snowy days. If we have a recall of 0.8 on snowy days,
this is represented by wtest |= snowy(x) ⊃ Recall`,0.8(x).
More generally, if the classifier C achieves a recall of
more than 0.9 in situations γ1, γ2, . . . , γm, this can be
represented by wtest |=
∧m
i=1
(
γi(x) ⊃ Recall`,(0.9,1](x)
)
.
5.3 Generalization Error
We next formalize the generalization error of a classi-
fier, i.e., a measure of how accurately a classifier is able
to predict the class of previously unseen input data.
Since a classifier has been trained on a finite sample
training dataset w train, it may be overfitted to w train
and have worse classification performance on new in-
put data that have not been included in w train.
To formalize the generalization error, we introduce a
formula λL(y, yˆ) to represent that given a correct label
y and a predicted label yˆ, the expected value of losses
(i.e., real numbers representing the penalty for incorrect
classification) is at most a non-negative real number L.
Formally, the semantics of λL(y, yˆ) is given by:
w |= λL(y, yˆ) iff E
(v,vˆ)∼σw(y,yˆ)
loss(v, vˆ) ≤ L,
where loss is a loss function selected according to the
data domain O, and a pair (v, v′) of a correct label and
a predicted label follows the joint distribution σw(y, yˆ).
Now the generalization error being L or smaller at a
true distribution w true is written as w true |= GEL(x, y, yˆ)
where:
GEL(x, y, yˆ)
def
=
(
h(x, y) ∧ ψ(x, yˆ)) ⊃ λL(y, yˆ).
Since we usually cannot obtain the true distribu-
tion w true and cannot check the satisfaction w true |=
GEL(x, y, yˆ), we often compute an empirical error (as
an approximation of the generalization error) by using
a finite test dataset wtest that is believed to be an ap-
proximation of w true. This testing can be expressed as
wtest |= GEL(x, y, yˆ).
On the other hand, given a training dataset w train,
the training error being at most Ltrain is represented by
w train |= GELtrain(x, y, yˆ). Then the overfitting of the clas-
sifier can be evaluated by comparing the empirical error
L with the training error Ltrain. When the empirical er-
ror is smaller than Ltrain +ε for some error bound ε > 0,
this can be represented by wtest |= GELtrain+ε(x, y, yˆ).
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Fig. 3: The robustness compares the conditional probability in the test dataset wtest with that in another possible
world w′ that is close to wtest in terms of Rε,Wdx . Note that an adversary’s choice of the input distribution σw′(x)
is formalized as a non-deterministic choice of the possible world w′.
6 Formalizing the Robustness of Classifiers
Many recent studies have found attacks on machine
learning where a malicious adversary manipulates the
input to cause a malfunction in a machine learning
task [12]. Such input data, called adversarial exam-
ples [40], are designed to make a classifier fail to pre-
dict the actual class ` of the input, but are recognized
to belong to ` from human eyes. In computer vision,
for example, Goodfellow et al. [20] create an adversar-
ial example by adding undetectable noise to a panda’s
photo so that humans can still recognize the perturbed
image as a panda, but a classifier misclassifies it as a
gibbon. To prevent or mitigate such attacks, the clas-
sifier should be robust against perturbed input, i.e., it
should return similar predicted labels given similar in-
put data.
In this section we formalize robustness notions for
classifiers by using epistemic operators in StatEL (See
Fig. 3 for an overview of the formalization). Further-
more, we show certain relationships between classifica-
tion performance and robustness, and suggest a class of
robustness properties that have not been formalized in
the literature as far as we know. We present an overview
of these formalizations and relationships in Fig. 4.
6.1 Total Correctness of Classifiers
We first note that the total correctness of classifiers
could be formalized as a classification performance (e.g.,
precision, recall, or accuracy) in the presence of all pos-
sible inputs from adversaries. For example, the total
correctness could be formalized as M |= Recall`,I(x),
which represents that Recall`,I(x) is satisfied in all pos-
sible worlds of M.
In practice, however, it is not possible or tractable to
test whether the classification performance is achieved
for all possible test datasets (corresponding to an infi-
nite number of possible worlds inM). Hence we need a
weaker form of a correctness notion, which may be ver-
ified or tested in some way. In the following sections,
we deal with robustness notions that are weaker than
total correctness.
6.2 Accessibility Relation for Robustness
To formalize robustness notions, we introduce an ac-
cessibility relation Rε,Wdx that relates two worlds having
closer inputs as follows.
Definition 8 (Accessibility relation for robust-
ness) We define an accessibility relation Rε,Wdx ⊆ W ×
W by:
Rε,Wdx def= {(w,w′) ∈ W ×W | Wd(σw(x), σw′(x)) ≤ ε},
where Wd is ∞-Wasserstein distance w.r.t. a metric d
in Definition 2.
Then (w,w′) ∈ Rε,Wdx represents that the two distri-
butions σw(x) and σw′(x) of inputs to the classifier C
are close in terms of the distance Wd .
6 Intuitively, for
example, Wd means the distance between two image
datasets σw(x) and σw′(x) when the distance between
individual images are measured by a metric d .
Then an epistemic formula Kε,Wd ϕ represents that
we are confidence that ϕ is true even when the input
data are perturbed by noise of the level ε or smaller.
6 Wd(σw(x), σw′(x)) ≤ ε expresses that each value of the
input x from the dataset w is close to the corresponding value
of x from w′ in terms of the metric d between individual data.
For example, each input image x in the dataset w looks similar
to the corresponding image in w′ from the human’ eyes.
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6.3 Probabilistic Robustness against Targeted Attacks
When a robustness attack aims at misclassifying an in-
put as a specific target label ˆ`tar, then it is called a tar-
geted attack. For instance, in the above-mentioned at-
tack by [20], a gibbon is the target into which a panda’s
photo is misclassified.
In this section, we discuss how we formalize robust-
ness using the epistemic operator Kε,Wd . We denote by
v ∈ D an original input image in the test dataset wtest,
and by v˜ ∈ D an image obtained by perturbing the
original image v by noise.
A first definition of robustness against targeted at-
tacks might be:
For any v, v˜ ∈ D, ifH(v) = panda and d(v, v˜) ≤ ε,
then C(v′) 6= gibbon,
which represents that when an image v˜ is obtained by
perturbing a panda’s photo v by noise, then it will not
be classified as the target label gibbon at all. This can
be formalized using StatEL by:
M,wtest |= hpanda(x) ⊃ Kε,Wd P0 ψgibbon(x).
However, this notion does not accept a negligible prob-
ability of misclassification, and does not cover the case
where the human cannot recognize the perturbed image
v˜ as panda (e.g., when the perturbed image v˜ is obtained
by linear displacement, rescaling, and rotation [2], then
H(v˜) 6= panda may hold).
To overcome these issues, we introduce the follow-
ing definition with some conditional probability δ of
misclassification as follows.
Definition 9 (Targeted robustness) Let δ ∈ [0, 1].
Given a dataset wtest, a classifier C satisfies probabilistic
targeted robustness w.r.t. an actual label ` and a target
label ˆ`tar if for any input v ∈ supp(σwtest(x)) from the
dataset wtest, and for any perturbed input v˜ ∈ D s.t.
d(v, v′) ≤ ε, we have:
Pr[C(v˜) = ˆ`tar | H(v˜) = ` ] ≤ δ. (1)
For instance, when the actual class ` is panda and
the target label ˆ`tar is gibbon, then the classifier C mis-
classifies a panda’s photo as gibbon with only a small
probability δ.
Now we express this robustness notion with I =
[1− δ, 1] by using StatEL.
Proposition 2 (Targeted robustness) Let I ⊆ [0, 1].
The probabilistic targeted robustness w.r.t. an actual la-
bel ` and a target label ˆ`tar under a given test dataset
wtest is expressed by wtest |= TRobust`,ˆ`tar,I(x) where:
TRobust`,ˆ`tar,I(x)
def
= Kε,Wd
(
h`(x) ⊃ PI ¬ψˆ`
tar
(x)
)
.
Proof Let w′ be a possible world such that (wtest, w′) ∈
Rε,Wdx . Then w′ corresponds to the dataset obtained
by perturbing each data in w. Let v˜ ∈ supp(σw′(x)).
Then v˜ represents a perturbed input. Let w′′ = w′|h`(x).
Then (1) is logically equivalent to w′′ |= P[0,δ] ψˆ`tar (x).
By Definition 6, w′ |= h`(x) ⊃ P[0,δ] ψˆ`tar (x). By I =
[1 − δ, 1], w′ |= h`(x) ⊃ PI ¬ψˆ`
tar
(x). Therefore this
proposition follows from the semantics for Kε,Wd . uunionsq
Since the Lp-distances7 are often regarded as reason-
able approximations of human perceptual distances [10],
they are used as distance constraints on the perturba-
tion in many researches on targeted attacks (e.g. [40,20,
10]). Our model can represent the robustness against
these attacks by using the Lp-distance as a metric d for
Rε,Wdx .
6.4 Probabilistic Robustness against Non-Targeted
Attacks
In this section we formalize non-targeted attacks [33,32]
in which adversaries try to misclassify inputs as some
arbitrary incorrect labels (i.e., not as a specific label
like a gibbon). Compared to targeted attacks, this kind
of attacks are easier to mount, but harder to defend.
We first define the notion of robustness against non-
targeted attacks as follows.
Definition 10 (Non-targeted robustness) Let δ ∈
[0, 1]. Given a dataset wtest, a classifier C satisfies proba-
bilistic non-targeted robustness w.r.t. an actual label ` if
for any input v ∈ supp(σwtest(x)) from the dataset wtest,
and for any perturbed input v˜ ∈ D s.t. d(v, v′) ≤ ε, we
have:
Pr[C(v˜) = ` | H(v˜) = ` ] > 1− δ.
Now we express this robustness notion with I =
[1− δ, 1] by using StatEL.
Proposition 3 (Non-targeted robustness) Let I ⊆
[0, 1]. The probabilistic non-targeted robustness under a
test dataset wtest is expressed by wtest |= Robust`,I(x)
where:
Robust`,I(x)
def
= Kε,Wd
(
h`(x) ⊃ PI ψ`(x)
)
= Kε,Wd Recall`,I(x).
Proof The proof is analogous to that for Proposition 2.
uunionsq
7 The Lp-distance between n-dimensional real vectors x
and x′ is written ‖x − x′‖p where the p-norm is defined by
‖v‖p = (
∑n
i=1 |vi|p)1/p.
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Fig. 4: Robustness notions and their relationships.
6.5 Relationships among Robustness Notions
In this section we present relationships among notions
of robustness and performance, and discuss properties
related to robustness.
We first present the following proposition immediate
from the definitions.
Proposition 4 (Relationships among notions) Let
I ⊆ [0, 1] and `, ˆ`tar ∈L. Then we have:
1. wtest |= Robust ,`I(x) implies wtest |= TRobust ,`ˆ`tar,I(x).
2. wtest |= Robust`,I(x) implies M,wtest |= Recall`,I(x).
The first claim means that probabilistic non-targeted
robustness is not weaker than probabilistic targeted
robustness for the same I. The second claim means
that probabilistic non-targeted robustness implies recall
without perturbation noise. Note that this is immediate
from the reflexivity of Rε,Wdx .
Next we remark that our extension of StatEL can be
used to describe a certain situation where adversarial
attacks are mitigated. When we apply some mechanism
T that preprocesses a given input to mitigate attacks on
robustness, then the probabilistic targeted robustness is
expressed as wtest |= ∆TRobust`,I(x) where ∆T is the
modality for the dataset transformation T .
Finally, we recall that by Proposition 3, robustness
can be regarded as recall in the presence of perturbed
noise. This implies that for each property ϕ in the table
of confusion (Table 1), we could consider Kε,Wd ϕ as a
property to evaluate the classification performance in
the presence of adversarial inputs although this has not
been formalized in the literature of robustness of ma-
chine learning as far as we recognize. For example, pre-
cision robustness Kε,Wd Precision`,i(x) represents that in
the presence of perturbed noise, the prediction is cor-
rect with a probability i given that it is positive. For an-
other example, accuracy robustness Kε,Wd Accuracy`,i(x)
represents that in the presence of perturbed noise, the
prediction is correct (whether it is positive or negative)
with a probability i.
Example 2 (Robustness of pedestrian detection) We il-
lustrate robustness notions using the pedestrian detec-
tion in Example 1 in Section 5.2. We deal with a binary
classifier C that detects whether a pedestrian is crossing
the road in a photo image x.
The non-targeted robustness Kε,Wd Recall`,0.9(x) rep-
resents that in the presence of perturbed noise to the
input image x, with probability 0.9 the classifier C can
detect a person crossing the road when the human can
actually recognize. This robustness is crucial for an au-
tonomous car not to hit a pedestrian.
The precision robustness Kε,Wd Precision`,0.9(x) rep-
resents that in the presence of perturbed noise to x,
with probability 0.9 the human can actually recognize
a person crossing the road when the classifier C de-
tects it. This type of robustness is important for an
autonomous car to avoid stopping suddenly due to a
false alarm (not take the crash from the car behind).
7 Formalizing the Fairness of Classifiers
Many studies have proposed and investigated various
notions of fairness in machine learning [5]. Informally,
these fairness notions mean that the results of machine
learning tasks are irrelevant of some sensitive attributes,
e.g., gender, age, race, disease, political/religious view.
In a recently few years, there have been studies on the
testing methods for fairness of machine learning [18,1,
42].
In this section, we formalize popular notions of fair-
ness of supervised learning by using our extension of
StatEL. Here we focus on the fairness that should be
maintained in the impact (i.e., the results of machine
learning tasks) rather than the treatment (i.e., the pro-
cess of machine learning tasks). This is because previ-
ous research show that many seemingly neutral features
have statistical relationships with sensitive attributes,
and hence just ignoring or removing sensitive attributes
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in the process of data preparation and training8 is of-
ten ineffective or harmful to achieve the fairness and
performance of learning tasks.
7.1 Basic Ideas and Notations
Various notions of fairness in supervised learning are
classified into three categories: independence, separa-
tion, and sufficiency [5]. All of these have the form of
(conditional) independence or its relaxation, and thus
can be formalized using the modal operator ∼ε,Dx for
conditional indistinguishability (defined in Sect. 3.4) in
our extension of StatEL.9
In the formalization of fairness notions, we use a dis-
tributional Kripke model M = (W, (Ra)a∈A, (Vs)s∈S).
Recall that x, y, and yˆ are measurement variables re-
spectively denoting the input datum, the actual class
label (given by the oracle H), and the predicted la-
bel (output by the classifier C). Given a real world
wtest (corresponding to a given test dataset), σwtest(x)
is the probability distribution of C’s test input over D,
σwtest(y) is the distribution of the actual label over L,
and σwtest(yˆ) is the distribution of C’s output over L.
Fairness notions are usually defined in terms of some
sensitive attribute (e.g., gender, age, race, disease, po-
litical/religious view), which is defined as a tuple of
subsets of the input data domain D. For example, a
sensitive attribute based on ages can be defined as a
pair of groups G0 (input data with ages 21 to 60) and
G1 (ages 61 to 100). For each group G ⊆ D of inputs, we
introduce a static formula ηG(x) representing that an
input x belongs to G. Formally, this is interpreted by:
For each state s ∈ S, s |= ηG(x) iff σs(x) ∈ G.
Roughly speaking, a machine learning task is said
to be fair if the performance of the task for a group
G0’s input is similar to that for another group G1’s
input.10 In the following sections, we formalize the three
categories of fairness of classifiers and their relaxation.
A summary of this formalization is presented in Table 2.
8 Such unawareness requires that sensitive attributes are
not explicitly used in the learning process. However, StatEL
may not be suited to formalizing this requirement.
9 Compared to the preliminary version [28] of this paper,
we corrected errors and changed the formalization into a
more comprehensible form by introducing the operator ∼ε,Dx
and by removing the counter factual epistemic operators and
a formula ξd representing that the input is drawn from a
dataset d.
10 Some fairness notions (e.g., equal opportunity) assume
G1 = D \G0.
7.2 Independence (a.k.a. Group Fairness, Statistical
Parity) and its Relaxation
In this section we explain and formalize the notion of
independence [9], which is also known as group fair-
ness [15] 11, and its relaxed notion. Intuitively, indepen-
dence means that the predicted label yˆ does not have
statistical relationships with the membership in a sen-
sitive group. For example, independence does not allow
a bank’s lending rate to be correlated with a sensitive
attribute such as gender.
We first present the definition of a relaxed notion of
independence, called group fairness up to bias ε [15] as
follows. Intuitively, this is the property that the output
distributions of the classifier are roughly identical when
input data belong to different groups.
Formally, this fairness notion is defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Independence, group fairness) Let
G0, G1 ⊆ D be sets of input data constituting a sensi-
tive attribute. For each b = 0, 1, let µGb ∈ DL be the
probability distribution of the predicted label ˆ` output
by a classifier C when an input v is sampled from a test
dataset wtest and belongs to Gb; i.e., for each ˆ`∈ L,
µGb [
ˆ`]
def
= Pr[C(v) = ˆ` | v $← σwtest(x) and v ∈ Gb ]. (2)
Then a classifier C satisfies the group fairness between
groups G0 and G1 up to bias ε if Dtv(µG0‖µG1) ≤ ε,
where Dtv is the total variation between distributions
(defined in Sect. 2.2). A classifier C satisfies indepen-
dence w.r.t. groups G0 and G1 if it satisfies the group
fairness between G0 and G1 up to bias 0.
Now we express this fairness notion using our ex-
tension of StatEL as follows.
Proposition 5 (Independence, group fairness) The
group fairness between groups G0 and G1 up to bias ε
under a given test dataset wtest is expressed as wtest |=
GrpFairε(x, yˆ) where:
GrpFairε(x, yˆ)
def
=
(
ηG0(x)∧ψ(x, yˆ)
)∼ε,Dtvyˆ (ηG1(x)∧ψ(x, yˆ)).
Independence (without bias ε) is expressed by wtest |=
GrpFair0(x, yˆ).
Proof Let wb = wtest|ηGb (x)∧ψ(x,yˆ). It follows from (2)
that for each ˆ`∈ L, µGb [ˆ`] = Pr[σs(yˆ) = ˆ` | s $← wb ],
hence µGb = σwb(yˆ). Thus, by Definition 11, the group
fairness between groups G0 and G1 up to bias ε is given
by Dtv(σw0(yˆ)‖σw1(yˆ)) ≤ ε. Therefore, this proposition
follows from Lemma 1. uunionsq
11 In previous literature, independence has been referred
to also as different terminologies, such as statistical parity,
demographic parity, and disparate impact.
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Table 2: Popular notions of fairness of machine learning
Sect. Formalization of fairness notions
7.2 Independence (a.k.a. group fairness)
GrpFairε(x, yˆ)
def
=
(
ηG0(x) ∧ ψ(x, yˆ)
)∼ε,Dtvyˆ (ηG1(x) ∧ ψ(x, yˆ))
7.3 Separation (a.k.a. equalized odds)
EqOddsε(x, yˆ)
def
=
∧
`∈L
((
ηG0(x) ∧ ψ(x, yˆ) ∧ h`(x)
)∼ε,Dtvyˆ (ηG1(x) ∧ ψ(x, yˆ) ∧ h`(x)))
7.3 Equal opportunity (a relaxation of separation)
EqOpp(x, yˆ)
def
=
(
ηG0(x) ∧ ψ(x, yˆ) ∧ h`(x)
)∼0,Dtvyˆ (¬ηG0(x) ∧ ψ(x, yˆ) ∧ h`(x))
7.4 Sufficiency (a.k.a. conditional use accuracy equality)
Sufficencyε(x, y)
def
=
∧
ˆ`∈L
((
ηG0(x) ∧ ψˆ`(x) ∧ h(x, y)
)∼ε,Dtvy (ηG1(x) ∧ ψˆ`(x) ∧ h(x, y)))
Example 3 (Independence in pedestrian detection) We
illustrate independence using the pedestrian detection
in Example 1 in Section 5.2. We deal with a binary
classifier C that detects whether or not a pedestrian is
crossing the road in an image x. We write ηm(x) (resp.
ηw(x)) to represent that an image x includes a man
(resp. woman) that may or not be crossing the road.
Let ψ(x, yˆ) represent that given an input image x, the
classifier C returns yˆ (that is either the detection of a
person crossing the road or not).
Then the independence between men and women
GrpFair0(x, yˆ)
def
=
(
ηm(x)∧ψ(x, yˆ)
)∼0,Dtvyˆ (ηw(x)∧ψ(x, yˆ))
means that the probability of detecting a pedestrian
crossing the road is the same between men and women.
This fairness guarantees that men and women are equally
detectable as pedestrians, hence equally safe against an
autonomous car. Here independence does not rely on
the actual label y, i.e., on whether there is a pedestrian
crossing the road that can be detected by human eyes.
7.3 Separation (a.k.a. Equalized Odds) and its
Relaxation (Equal Opportunity)
In this section we explain and formalize the notion
of separation [5] 12, which is well-known as equalized
odds [22], and its relaxed notion called equal opportu-
nity [22]. The motivation behind these notions is to cap-
ture typical scenarios in which sensitive characteristics
may have statistical relationships with the actual class
label. For instance, even when some sensitive attribute
is correlated with an actual default rate on loans, banks
might want to have a different lending rate for people
who have a higher default rate. However, independence
12 In previous literature, separation has been referred to also
as disparate mistreatment [46] and conditional procedure ac-
curacy equality [6].
(group fairness) does not allow this, since it requires
that the lending rate should be statistically indepen-
dent of the sensitive attribute.
To overcome this problem, the notion of separation
allows statistical relationships between a sensitive at-
tribute and the predicted label yˆ output by the classi-
fier C to the extent that this is justified by the actual
class label y. More precisely, separation means that the
predicted label yˆ is conditionally independent of the
membership in a sensitive group, given an actual class
label y.
Formally, separation is defined as a property that
recall (true positive rate) and specificity (true nega-
tive rate, explained in Table 1) are the same for all the
groups, and equal opportunity is defined as a special
case of separation only for an advantageous class label.
Definition 12 (Separation & equal opportunity)
Given a group Gb ⊆ D and an actual class label `, let
µGb,` ∈ DL be the probability distribution of the pre-
dicted label ˆ` output by a classifier C when an input
v ∈ Gb is sampled from a test dataset wtest and is asso-
ciated with an actual label `; i.e., for each ˆ`∈ L,
µGb,`[
ˆ`]
def
= Pr[C(v) = ˆ`| v $←σwtest(x), v ∈ Gb, H(v)= ` ].
(3)
A classifier C satisfies separation between two groups
G0 and G1 if µG0,` = µG1,` holds for all ` ∈ L. A
classifier C satisfies equal opportunity of an advanta-
geous label ` w.r.t. a group G0 if µG0,` = µG1,` where
G1 = D \G0.
Now we express these two notions using our exten-
sion of StatEL as follows.
Proposition 6 (Separation) Let γ(x, `, yˆ)
def
= ψ(x, yˆ)
∧h`(x). The separation between two groups G0 and G1
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under a given test dataset wtest is expressed as wtest |=
EqOdds0(x, yˆ) where:
EqOddsε(x, yˆ)
def
=∧
`∈L
((
ηG0(x) ∧ γ(x, `, yˆ)
)∼ε,Dtvyˆ (ηG1(x) ∧ γ(x, `, yˆ))).
Proof Let ` ∈ L and wb,` = wtest|ηGb (x)∧ψ(x,yˆ)∧h`(x). It
follows from (3) that:
µGb,`[
ˆ`] = Pr[σs(yˆ) = ˆ` | s $← wb,` ],
hence µGb,` = σwb,`(yˆ). Thus, by Definition 12, the
separation between G0 and G1 is given by σw0,`(yˆ) =
σw1,`(yˆ) for all ` ∈ L. Therefore, this proposition follows
from Proposition 1. uunionsq
It should be noted that for ε > 0, EqOddsε(x, yˆ)
represents a relaxation of separation up to bias ε in
terms of total variation Dtv.
Proposition 7 (Equal opportunity) Let γ(x, `, yˆ)
def
=
ψ(x, yˆ)∧h`(x). The equal opportunity of a label ` w.r.t.
a group G0 under a given test dataset wtest is expressed
as wtest |= EqOpp(x, yˆ) where:
EqOpp(x, yˆ)
def
=(
ηG0(x) ∧ γ(x, `, yˆ)
)∼0,Dtvyˆ (¬ηG0(x) ∧ γ(x, `, yˆ)).
Proof The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
Proposition 6. LetG1 = D\G0. By µGb,` = σwb,`(yˆ), the
equal opportunity of ` w.r.t. G0 is given by σw0,`(yˆ) =
σw1,`(yˆ). Therefore, this proposition follows from Propo-
sition 1. uunionsq
Example 4 (Separation in pedestrian detection) We il-
lustrate separation using the pedestrian detection in
Example 3 where a binary classifier C detects whether
a pedestrian is crossing the road in an image x. Let
ψ(x, yˆ) (resp. h(x, y)) represent that given an image x,
the classifier C (resp. human) returns yˆ (resp. y) rep-
resenting either detection or not.
The level of the inherent technical difficulty of de-
tecting a female pedestrian may be different from that
of a male pedestrian, because, for example, the physi-
cal appearance may tend to be different between women
and men. If we take this possible difference into account,
separation can be suited instead of independence.
The separation EqOdds0(x, yˆ) between men and women
guarantees that the conditional probability of detect-
ing a pedestrian crossing the road when the human
can actually recognize it, is the same between men and
women. This fairness implies that (from the viewpoint
of a pedestrian crossing the road) male and female pedes-
trians may be hit by an autonomous car as fairly as by
the human-driven car.
7.4 Sufficiency (a.k.a. Conditional Use Accuracy
Equality)
In this section we explain and formalize the notion of
sufficiency [5], which is also known as conditional use
accuracy equality [6].
While separation guarantees the equality of recall
among different groups, sufficiency requires the equality
of precision. More precisely, sufficiency is defined as the
property that precision (positive predictive value) and
negative predictive value (presented as NPV in Table 1)
are the same for all the groups as follows.
Definition 13 (Sufficiency) Given a group Gb ⊆ D
and a predicted label ˆ`, let µGb,ˆ` ∈ DL be the proba-
bility distribution of the actual class label ` when an
input v ∈ Gb is sampled from a test dataset wtest and
the classifier C outputs the predicted label ˆ`; i.e., for
each ` ∈ L,
µGb,ˆ`[` ]
def
= Pr[H(v) = ` | v $←σwtest(x), v ∈ Gb, C(v)= ˆ` ].
(4)
A classifier C satisfies sufficiency between two groups
G0 and G1 if µG0,ˆ` = µG1,ˆ` holds for all
ˆ`∈ L.
Then this notion can be expressed using our exten-
sion of StatEL as follows.
Proposition 8 (Sufficiency) Let γ′(x, y, ˆ`)
def
= ψˆ`(x)
∧h(x, y). The sufficiency between two groups G0 and G1
under a given test dataset wtest is expressed as wtest |=
Sufficency0(x, y) where:
Sufficencyε(x, y)
def
=∧
ˆ`∈L
((
ηG0(x) ∧ γ′(x, y, ˆ`)
)∼ε,Dtvy (ηG1(x) ∧ γ′(x, y, ˆ`))).
Proof Let ˆ` ∈ L and wb,ˆ` = wtest|ηGb (x)∧ψˆ`(x)∧h(x,y). It
follows from (4) that:
µGb,ˆ`[` ] = Pr[σs(y) = ` | s
$← wb,ˆ` ],
hence µGb,ˆ` = σwb,ˆ`(y). Thus, by Definition 13, the
sufficiency between G0 and G1 is given by σw0,ˆ`(y) =
σw1,ˆ`(y) for all
ˆ`∈ L. Therefore, this proposition follows
from Proposition 1. uunionsq
It should be noted that for ε > 0, Sufficencyε(x, y)
represents a relaxation of sufficiency up to bias ε in
terms of total variation Dtv.
Example 5 (Sufficiency in pedestrian detection) We il-
lustrate sufficiency using the pedestrian detection in
Example 3 where a classifier C detects whether a pedes-
trian is crossing the road in an image x. As mentioned in
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Example 4, the level of the inherent technical difficulty
of detecting a male pedestrian may be different from
that of a female pedestrian. Whereas separation guar-
antees the equality of recall between men and women,
sufficiency guarantees that of precision.
The sufficiency Sufficency0(x, y) between men and
women implies that the conditional probability that
there is no pedestrian crossing the road when C detects
it, is the same between men and women. From the view-
point of the car driver, when C raises a false alarm and
stops the car suddenly, we have no bias about which of
men and women are more likely to trigger false alarms
and to be blamed for that.
8 Related Work
In this section, we provide a brief overview of related
work on the specification of statistical machine learning
and on epistemic logic for describing specification.
Desirable properties of statistical machine learning. There
have been a large number of papers on attacks and de-
fences for deep neural networks [40,12]. Compared to
them, however, not much work has been done to explore
the formal specification of various properties of machine
learning. Seshia et al. [38] present a list of desirable
properties of DNNs (deep neural networks) although
most of the properties are presented informally without
mathematical formulas. As for robustness, Dreossi et
al. [13] propose a unifying formalization of adversarial
input generation in a rigorous and organized manner,
although they formalize and classify attacks (as opti-
mization problems) rather than define the robustness
notions themselves.
Concerning the fairness notions, Barocas et al. [5]
survey various fairness notions and classify them into
the three categories: independence, separation, and suf-
ficiency. Gajane [17] surveys the formalization of fair-
ness notions for machine learning and present some jus-
tification based on social science literature.
Epistemic logic for describing specification. Epistemic
logic [44] has been studied to represent and reason about
knowledge and belief [16,21], and has been applied to
describe various properties of distributed systems.
The BAN logic [8], proposed by Burrows, Abadi and
Needham, is a notable example of epistemic logic used
to model and verify the authentication in cryptographic
protocols. To improve the formalization of protocols’
behaviors, some epistemic approaches integrate process
calculi [24,11].
Epistemic logic has also been used to formalize and
reason about privacy properties, including anonymity [39,
19,29], receipt-freeness of electronic voting protocols [25],
and privacy policy for social network services [34]. Tem-
poral epistemic logic is used to express information flow
security policies [3].
Concerning the formalization of fairness notions, pre-
vious work in formal methods has modeled different
kinds of fairness involving timing by using temporal
logic rather than epistemic logic. As far as we know, no
previous work has formalized fairness notions of ma-
chine learning by using modal logic.
Formalization of statistical properties. In studies of philo-
sophical logic, Lewis [31] shows the idea that when a
random value has various possible probability distribu-
tions, then those distributions should be represented on
distinct possible worlds. Bana [4] puts Lewis’s idea in
a mathematically rigorous setting. Recently, a modal
logic called statistical epistemic logic (StatEL) [27] has
been proposed and used to formalize statistical hypoth-
esis testing and the notion of differential privacy [14].
To describe statistical properties of machine learn-
ing models, this work uses StatEL to formalize the
probabilistically chosen input to a learning model and
the non-deterministically chosen dataset. However, we
could possibly employ other logics (e.g., fuzzy logic [45]
or Markov logic network [37]) by extending them to deal
with statistical sampling and non-deterministic inputs.
Exploring the possibility of different formalization us-
ing other logics is left for future work.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed an epistemic approach to
the modeling of supervised learning and its desirable
properties. Specifically, we employed a distributional
Kripke model in which each possible world corresponds
to a possible dataset and modal operators are inter-
preted as transformation and testing on datasets. Then
we formalized various notions of the classification per-
formance, robustness, and fairness of statistical clas-
sifiers by using our extension of statistical epistemic
logic (StatEL). In this formalization, we clarified rela-
tionships among properties of classifiers, and relevance
between classification performance and robustness.
We emphasize that this is the first attempt to use
epistemic models and logical formulas to describe sta-
tistical properties of machine learning, and would be a
starting point to develop theories of formal specification
of machine learning.
In future work, we are planning to extend our frame-
work to formally reason about system-level properties
of learning-based systems. We are also interested in
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developing a more general framework for the formal
specification of machine learning associated with test-
ing methods, as well as in implementing a prototype
tool. Our future work will also include an extension
of StatEL to formalize unsupervised learning and rein-
forcement learning.
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